2002 | Seven minutes to midnight Little progress is made on global nuclear disarmament. The United States rejects a series of arms control treaties and announces it will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Terrorists seek to acquire and use nuclear and biological weapons.
The grim fact is, the world could end at any time, now or any time in the last 50 years. Even in times of peace, there have been many false missile alerts that could have gone all the way.
In January 1995, for example, Norway launched a satellite that went into Russian air space, and because of a foul-up in the Russian government, the pre-announced launch was not made known in advance to the Russian military missile command center. I first read about this in TIME, and saw later reports of it on ABC News, Frontline, Nightline and CBS. The Russians almost launched a first strike against the U.S., thinking they were retaliating AGAINST a first strike by the U.S. A high-up military officer made a calculated risk to stand down, and that's the only reason we didn't have a war.
As the Russian military has no money to spend on their aging defense systems and surveilance sattelites and early warning system, and training of staff, the likelihood of an accidental launch is vastly increased.
Russian soldiers guarding missiles and raw plutonium, worth millions, have often not been paid for months. Arab nations, terror organizations, and even organized crime, would love to have those nuclear weapons. Nuclear "suitcase-bombs" of the Russian government cannot all be accounted for, and may already be in terrorist hands.
The fact that the U.S. government now has a backup "shadow government" hidden in a bunker "somewhere on the East coast" is more than "just a precaution". It's part of a very real possibility of a nuclear strike in Washington D.C.
A regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan is considered the most likely nuclear exchange.
But nations like China, and very soon North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, are developing long range missiles that could reach the United States. So within 5 to 10 years, it will not just be Russia and China that could launch a missile strike on the United States, but many others as well.
I would be very surprised if European nations were not also very concerned about this, given their closer proximity to Muslim nations.
Another scenario that both Russian and U.S. military strategists must be aware of, is the possibility that a third party could launch a nuclear missile at the U.S. or Russia, making it appear that one is attacking the other, starting a nuclear exchange between them, leaving the world open to Muslim, or Chinese, or someone else's domination. But the radiation released by an exchange between the U.S. and Russia would irradiate the entire planet, so there's no third-party nation that wouldn't be annihilated as well.
When the U.S. and Russia were the only nations with nuclear weapons, there was enough forethought, about the catastrophic loss of actually using these weapons, to prevent a nuclear war from actually occurring.
But now the technology is accessible to many, whose anger and religious zeal makes them blind to the devastation these weapons would cause. There is the terrifying reality that these Muslim fanatics will use these weapons on the U.S. and other "Crusaders" as soon as they acquire them.
The Iraqi government was using a nuclear power plant in 1981 to create weapons grade plutonium, to build nuclear weapons. In 1981, the Israeli government did an air-strike and bombed that plant to the ground. It was officially condemned by the other nations of the world, but those same nations behind the scenes breathed a huge sigh of relief that the nuclear plant was destroyed.
I think the U.S. should do the same, in North Korea and these Muslim countries, as Israel did in Iraq, before it is too late. And world opinion be damned.
I actually think that it would only be in response to a full-scale nuclear strike that the U.S. would ever use nukes.
To my knowledge, the last time it was even considered, except in an accidental launch against a perceived first-strike, was the Cuban Missile Crisis in November 1962.
In the 1991 Iraq war, it was threatened by the U.S. that if Iraq used biological or chemical weapons or nukes, that the U.S. would retaliate with nukes. But later was revealed that the U.S. would not have used nukes during that war, in any circumstances.
The greatest danger is an accidental launch, in reaction to a falsely perceived attack, where one side would launch all their silos, and force the other side to do the same.
I wonder if computer hacks could access nuclear missiles, the way they can programs monitoring power plants and water treatment facilities.
quote:The Russians almost launched a first strike against the U.S., thinking they were retaliating AGAINST a first strike by the U.S. A high-up military officer made a calculated risk to stand down, and that's the only reason we didn't have a war.
It wasn't a "higher up military officer": it was Boris Yeltsin. He was handed the trigger, and decided not to use it.
quote: But nations like China, and very soon North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, are developing long range missiles that could reach the United States. So within 5 to 10 years, it will not just be Russia and China that could launch a missile strike on the United States, but many others as well.
China currently has the capacity to strike the west coast of the US with about 5 missiles. North Korea's demonstrated capacity is to hit Japan, Russia, China and South Korea. Iran's capability is somewhat less.
quote: The Iraqi government was using a nuclear power plant in 1981 to create weapons grade plutonium, to build nuclear weapons. In 1981, the Israeli government did an air-strike and bombed that plant to the ground. It was officially condemned by the other nations of the world, but those same nations behind the scenes breathed a huge sigh of relief that the nuclear plant was destroyed.
I think the U.S. should do the same, in North Korea and these Muslim countries, as Israel did in Iraq, before it is too late. And world opinion be damned.
I'm inclined to agree. Non-proliferation is in everyone's best interests. If that principle is enforced by airstrikes, then we're all better off.
Of course, I also think the US, Russia, China, France, Israel, and the UK should dispose of most of if not all of their nuclear arsenals, on the same rationale.
quote:Originally posted by Dave the Wonder Boy: I actually think that it would only be in response to a full-scale nuclear strike that the U.S. would ever use nukes.
Not everyone shares your sunny optimism about the benevolent nature of the United States government.
quote: To my knowledge, the last time it was even considered, except in an accidental launch against a perceived first-strike, was the Cuban Missile Crisis in November 1962.
The example which comes to mind immediately is MacArthur's advocacy of the use of nukes in the Korean War, but Eisenhower didn't like the idea.
Ah, one more: Nixon wanted to use nukes in Vietnam, but Kissiger refused to let him "become a butcher" (this was revealed last year when White House records were released).
I'm certain some casual research could come up with others: when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, did the US have a nuclear contigency plan for Pakistan?
quote: In the 1991 Iraq war, it was threatened by the U.S. that if Iraq used biological or chemical weapons or nukes, that the U.S. would retaliate with nukes. But later was revealed that the U.S. would not have used nukes during that war, in any circumstances.
Later revealed where? I've never heard of this.
quote:
The greatest danger is an accidental launch, in reaction to a falsely perceived attack, where one side would launch all their silos, and force the other side to do the same.
I wonder if computer hacks could access nuclear missiles, the way they can programs monitoring power plants and water treatment facilities.
All of these are good arguments in favour of total disarmament.
Chicago, February 27, 2002: Today, the Board of Directors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moves the minute hand of the "Doomsday Clock," the symbol of nuclear danger, from nine to seven minutes to midnight, the same setting at which the clock debuted 55 years ago. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, this is the third time the hand has moved forward.
We move the hands taking into account both negative and positive developments. The negative developments include:
[1] too little progress on global nuclear disarmament;
[2]growing concerns about the security of nuclear weapons materials worldwide;
[3] the continuing U.S. preference for unilateral action rather than cooperative international diplomacy;
[4] U.S. abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
[5] U.S. efforts to thwart the enactment of international agreements designed to constrain proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons;
[6]the crisis between India and Pakistan;
[7] terrorist efforts to acquire and use nuclear and biological weapons;
and
[8] the growing inequality between rich and poor around the world that increases the potential for violence and war.
If it were not for the positive changes highlighted later in this statement, the hands of the clock might have moved closer still.
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, founded by a group of World War II-era Manhattan Project scientists, has warned the world of nuclear dangers since 1945.
The September 11 attacks, and the subsequent and probably unrelated use of the mail to deliver deadly anthrax spores, breached previous boundaries for terrorist acts and should have been a global wake-up call. Moving the clock's hands at this time reflects our growing concern that the international community has hit the "snooze" button rather than respond to the alarm.
TROUBLING TRENDS AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
More than 31,000 nuclear weapons are still maintained by the eight known nuclear powers, a decrease of only 3,000 since 1998.
Ninety-five percent of these weapons are in the United States and Russia, and more than 16,000 are operationally deployed. Even if the United States and Russia complete their recently announced arms reductions over the next 10 years, they will continue to target thousands of nuclear weapons against each other.
Furthermore, many if not most of the U.S. warheads removed from the active stockpile will be placed in storage (along with some 5,000 warheads already held in reserve) rather than dismantled, for the express purpose of re-deploying them in some future contingency.
As a result, the total U.S. stockpile will remain at more than 10,000 warheads for the foreseeable future.
Russia, on the other hand, seeks a verifiable, binding agreement that would ensure retired U.S. and Russian weapons are actually destroyed, a position we support.
Despite a campaign promise to rethink nuclear policy, the Bush administration has taken no steps to significantly alter nuclear targeting doctrine or reduce the day-to-day alert status of U.S. nuclear forces.
If Russia is no longer an adversary, what is the rationale for retaining the ability to incinerate more than 2,000 Russian targets in as little as 30 minutes (or at all)?
Meanwhile, the U.S. national weapons laboratories, with the support of some in Congress, are hard at work refining existing warheads and designing entirely new weapons, with a special emphasis on those able to attack and destroy hardened and deeply buried targets. And to ensure that such new designs can be tested, the U.S. administration seeks to shorten the time required to resume testing to as little as twelve months--a move that can only encourage other countries, including India, Pakistan, and China, to consider resuming testing.
Although the United States has not conducted a full-scale test since 1992--and the administration says it has no plans to resume testing at this time--it refuses to recognize the overwhelming international support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and refuses to participate in international meetings to discuss implementing the treaty. Should the required signatories, including India and Pakistan, fail to ratify the CTBT, thus jeopardizing its entry into force, the world will lose an essential tool in halting the further development and spread of nuclear weapons.
Russia and the United States continue to maintain enormous stockpiles of fissile material. Russia has more than 1,000 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium and about 140 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium, and the United States has nearly 750 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium and 85 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. (Just 55 pounds--25 kilograms--of weapon-grade uranium, or 17.6 pounds of plutonium--8 kilograms--are needed to construct a rudimentary nuclear weapon.)
Fortunately, of the hundreds of attempted smuggling transactions involving radioactive materials that have been thwarted since 1991, the vast majority involved materials that were not weapons usable or were of insufficient quantity to construct a nuclear weapon. Only 18 of these cases involved the theft of weapon-grade uranium or plutonium from facilities in the former Soviet Union. At the same time, Al Qaeda operatives were actively seeking to acquire radioactive materials to fashion either a crude nuclear weapon or a radiological dispersion device, commonly known as a "dirty bomb."
The increase in the number of smuggling attempts in recent years serves as a clear warning that surplus nuclear weapons and weapons materials may not be entirely secure. Yet since 1991, successive U.S. and Russian administrations have failed to push for either a full inventory of weapons and materials, or for measures to confirm their destruction. As a result, it is now essentially impossible to verify whether all materials in the United States and Russia are accounted for or whether all weapons are secure. This squandered opportunity has enormous security ramifications.
The U.S. administration's decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty is a matter of great concern. The administration's rationale--that the treaty is a relic that endangers U.S. security interests--is disingenuous. Regrettably, the United States was unwilling to consider any compromise that would have preserved the basic framework of the treaty, and therefore blocked pursuit of a compromise that would have allowed additional testing but maintained some limits on defenses. Abandoning the treaty will have serious repercussions for years to come.
The crisis between India and Pakistan, touched off by a December 13 [2001] terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, marks the closest two states have come to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. When the hands of the clock were moved forward in 1998, to nine minutes to midnight, it was in part in anticipation of just this sort of scenario.
Nuclear proliferation continues to pose dangers, both regionally and internationally. Of the countries most often described as seeking nuclear weapons and/or ballistic missiles--Iraq, Iran, and North Korea--North Korea has repeatedly signaled its willingness to turn back, including a decision last year to extend its unilateral moratorium on missile flight tests through 2003. Yet the U.S. administration has abandoned negotiations with that country, and in his State of the Union message, President George W. Bush lumped all three countries together as an "axis of evil," warning that, "The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons."
The preference implicit in this statement for preemptive force over diplomacy, and for unilateral action rather than international cooperation, is likely to complicate efforts to defeat terrorism and strengthen global security.
The confluence of the rise of extremists who sacrifice their lives for their cause combined with weapons of mass destruction is an especially worrisome development. So too is the increased awareness since September 11 that terrorists need not manufacture or purchase fissile materials to fashion a crude nuclear weapon or release dangerous amounts of radiation. They need only attack poorly guarded nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons facilities, which contain sizable quantities of these materials. Significantly, President Bush acknowledged on January 29, 2002, that diagrams of U.S. nuclear power plants were found among Al Qaeda materials in Afghanistan.
When resetting the clock we have often noted that the growing disparities between rich and poor increase the potential for violence and war. Poverty and repression breed anger and desperation.
Charismatic leaders with easy answers prey on the dispossessed and disaffected, channeling their anger into dangerous and destructive activities.
The global community must recognize these facts and do much more to address them. The success of the war on terrorism depends not only on disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations, but also on eradicating the conditions that give rise to terror.
We therefore fully support the statement circulated by Bulletin sponsor John Polanyi and signed by 110 Nobel laureates last December, which reads in part, "The only hope for the future lies in cooperative international action, legitimized by democracy. . . . To survive in the world we have transformed, we must learn to think in a new way."
SOME WELCOME DEVELOPMENTS
At the same time, we want to recognize some welcome trends. Since we last set the clock in 1998, the 187 governments party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the major nuclear powers, agreed to a comprehensive set of commitments and measures to enhance nonproliferation and fulfill long-standing nuclear disarmament pledges. These agreements were rightly heralded as a political breakthrough, but the real test will be in how seriously the nuclear powers take their obligations to implement the practical steps to which they have agreed.
In this regard, we welcome France's dismantling of its Pacific nuclear test site and military reprocessing facilities and commend Britain's research program on verifying multilateral reductions in nuclear weapons as early steps in the right direction.
U.S. funding and technical assistance continues to make significant and cost-effective contributions to international security by working to ensure that Russian nuclear weapons are dismantled, and that nuclear materials and nuclear expertise do not leave Russia. Much remains to be done, however. After initially questioning the value of these cooperative programs, the Bush administration now seeks to increase their funding.
Since 2000, Russia has urged the United States to agree to reductions in the two countries' arsenals to 1,500 warheads each. President Bush's announcement in November 2001 that U.S. "operationally deployed strategic warheads" would be reduced to between 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012--an intention reaffirmed in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review in January--is positive news. It is also the first major commitment to reducing nuclear weapons made by either the United States or Russia since 1997.
Although there are serious questions about how permanent these reductions will be, and how long they will take to enact, they are nevertheless an important step away from the grotesque levels of the Cold War.
WHAT WOULD IT TAKE TO TURN BACK THE CLOCK?
As a first step in moving toward a safer world, we urge the United States and Russia to commit to reduce their nuclear arsenals to no more than 1,000 warheads each by the end of the decade. Each side should be free to choose its own means for achieving this goal, but both should commit, in writing, to transparency and verification provisions to ensure that the cuts are carried out and the delivery systems and warheads dismantled. Both countries should commit to storing and disposing of the resulting fissile material in a manner that makes the reductions irreversible. In addition, each side should commit to destroying at least half of the inactive weapons it currently stores within five years, and commit to destroying them all within 10 years.
These reductions must include tactical nuclear weapons as well. Significantly, the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review calls for studying whether the navy should be permitted to retire its nuclear-armed cruise missiles. If these weapons were retired, only about 150 air force bombs stored in seven European countries would remain in the U.S. operational tactical stockpile. We urge the swift retirement and destruction of all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and strongly encourage all states with nuclear weapons to begin negotiations to eliminate these weapons worldwide.
We also urge the United States and Russia to finally recognize the end of the Cold War by abandoning the practice of maintaining thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert, ready to be fired within minutes. This practice, born of fear and uncertainty during the Cold War, is a dangerous anachronism.
Significantly greater funding must be provided to secure and safeguard nuclear weapons and weapons materials in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere. For example, the current level of U.S. funding to assist Russia with such efforts is less than a third of the $3 billion annual expenditure recommended by an Energy Department task force last year. If weapons materials and expertise are not more tightly controlled, no city in the world will be safe from nuclear attack.
A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty must be placed back on the international arms control agenda. Every year that passes without a verifiable means of stopping the production worldwide of nuclear weapons materials makes the task of constraining nuclear proliferation more difficult. In addition, as part of such an agreement, all states with fissile material inventories should declare their current holdings and submit to an international verification and transparency regime that would continuously monitor surplus inventories and develop safe, effective, and permanent disposal options.
The United States should reconsider its plans to walk away from the ABM Treaty in June. As the U.S. intelligence community recently concluded, ballistic missiles are neither the most likely nor the most destructive threat facing the United States.
Other measures that would increase global stability include a ban on the deployment of space-based weapons, whether designed to damage or disrupt satellites or to attack targets on the ground or in the air; full adherence by all parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the resumption of negotiations on a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. Stronger international support for the global movement to limit the spread of small arms and to ban land mines, which each year maim or kill tens of thousands of people, most of them innocent civilians, would also be a welcome and necessary development.
Looking at the strike range of Iran, North Korea and China, the focus on long range strike capacity may score propaganda points within the US but ignores the tactical value of said weapons. Iran's goal is more likely to stay US naval power in the Persian Gulf and perhaps as far as the Red Sea. A nuclear Iran can keep 7th Fleet carrier groups out of both bodies of water and shift the balance of power in their favour. Would they strike Israel? Who knows? There certainly isn't any economic advantage in doing so.
The same goes with China and North Korea. The US has to consider the implications of naval actions in the East Pacific and Indian Oceans. US aggression may result in the Incredible Vaporizing Aircraft Carrier. If you're either Asian power the ability to take out Seattle, Honolulu and San Diego makes you pretty safe from conventional war. Anyone ever hear of imperial overreach?
It got put in Media X on the day Rex was being a bitchy little moron.
And then he moved it here.
Thus...
Rex is a bitch.
And Rob is gay.
'cause Rob's gay ass is responsible for Rex's conception and birth.
"Ah good. Now I'm on the internet clearly saying I like tranny cleavage. This shouldn't get me harassed at all." -- Lothar of the Hill People
ROGUE STATES: NUCLEAR RED-HERRINGS Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D, CDI President, bblair@cdi.org Dec. 5, 2003
For all the talk about rogue states acquiring nuclear weapons to threaten the United States, and all the heated debate about the United States developing mini-nukes and bunker busters to keep the rogues at bay, America’s nuclear weapons establishment does not pay much attention to the “axis of evil.” The real obsession of the U.S. nuclear enterprise at all levels – from Strategic Command in Omaha to the bomb custodians and designers in New Mexico – is keeping U.S. nuclear forces prepared to fight a large-scale nuclear war at a moment’s notice with …. Russia.
The dirty little secret of America’s current nuclear policy is that 99 percent of the nuclear weapons budget, planning, targeting, and operational activities still revolves around this one anachronistic scenario. The rationale is a throw-back to the Cold War, but however absurd, it still is the axis of current nuclear operations.
Scratch Russia from the list of enemies, as it should be, and all justification for maintaining a large U.S. nuclear arsenal evaporates.
There would be no planning to build a new factory – possibly in New Mexico – to produce plutonium triggers by the hundreds annually to support a U.S. arsenal of thousands of nuclear bombs. The drumbeat to resume nuclear testing to ensure the reliability of aging bombs would end. The drive to develop new bunker busters, reputedly to target rogue states but really meant to put at risk high-level nuclear command bunkers inside two mountains in Russia, would lose its impetus. The many tens of billions of dollars spent each year on operating and upgrading the thousands of U.S. bombs would be saved.
The United States and Russia currently possess 96 percent of the world’s total inventory of 30,000 nuclear weapons. Most of the rest belong to U.S. allies and friends – Britain, France and Israel. The combined arsenals of Pakistan and India, with whom the United States enjoys reasonable relations, represent a small fraction of 1 percent. That leaves China, hardly an enemy, whose 1 percent of the world total includes 20 long-range missiles that could hit the United States (compared to 6,000-plus U.S. nuclear weapons that could reach China today). Then there is North Korea, which maybe has a couple of weapons but no missiles or planes capable of dropping them on U.S. targets. The other proliferant states of concern – notably Iran – do not yet possess a single nuclear bomb.
A small fraction of the current U.S. arsenal of 10,650 bombs would amply cover all plausible nuclear threats to the American homeland, U.S. allies and interests overseas, if only the idea of fighting a large-scale nuclear war with Russia received the ridicule it deserves. Reasonable people not only scoff at the obsolete idea that the United States must be prepared for such a war in order to deter it, but also appreciate the many unnecessary risks incurred by clinging to this outdated world-view.
This anachronistic nuclear thinking has perpetuated the risky practice of keeping a hair-trigger on early warning and decision-making, as well as nuclear missile forces. Warning crews in Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., are allowed only three minutes to judge whether initial attack indications from satellite and ground sensors are valid or false. (Judgments of this sort are rendered daily, as a result of events as diverse as missiles being tested, or fired – for example, Russia’s firing of Scud missiles into Chechnya – peaceful satellites being lofted into space, or wildfires and solar reflections off oceans and clouds.) If an incoming missile strike is anticipated, the president and his top nuclear advisors would quickly convene an emergency telephone conference to hear urgent briefings – for example, the war room commander in Omaha would brief the president on his retaliatory options and their consequences, a briefing that is limited to 30 seconds. All of the large-scale responses comprising that briefing are designed for destroying Russian targets by the thousands, and the president would have only a few minutes to pick one if he wished to ensure its effective implementation. The order would then be sent immediately to the underground and undersea launch crews, whose own mindless firing drill would last only a few minutes. These tight timelines for decision-making at all levels are driven by only one scenario – a sudden, massive Russian attack.
The risks of launching on false warning, or by some unauthorized action, posed by this pressure-packed, decision-making-by-checklist may have been acceptable during the Cold War, but not today. Why carry such high risks if they stem from a totally fictitious threat? Ironically, the U.S. hair-trigger posture forces Russia into an identical stance, and the risks of a false alarm on the Russian side have grown since the end of the Cold War due to the steady deterioration of its early warning and command system. By acting as though Russia may intentionally attack, the United States is exposing itself to a real threat of unintentional Russian attack.
By keeping thousands of nuclear weapons fueled, armed, targeted, and ready to fire upon receiving a couple of short computer signals, the United States and Russia are further playing roulette with another real danger: nuclear terrorism. Keeping weapons cocked on hair-triggers raises many terrifying questions in the light of the global terrorist threat. Could terrorists spoof U.S. or Russian early warning systems, causing false alarms and semi-automatic responses that lead to and over the brink of nuclear war? If scores of heavily armed Chechens could take over a theater in Moscow, could terrorists seize mobile intercontinental Russian missiles, figure out how to circumvent the safeguards and fire them? Could terrorists electronically hack into missile launch circuits from remote locations, or into the communications network used to command strategic missiles, and cause an unauthorized launch?
If these scenarios sound far-fetched, remember that foresight of terrorist scenarios is much less than perfect, as the 9-11 hijackings revealed. And consider this: a past Pentagon review found a gaping hole in the computer security of a Navy radio network used to transmit launch orders to U.S. nuclear missile submarines. The investigation found that unauthorized persons, including terrorist hackers, might be able to slip electronically inside the network, seize control over the radio transmitters, and illicitly send fake orders to the boats. The deficiency was deemed so serious that the sub launch crews had to be given elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders in order to ensure that they would not fire upon receipt phony orders.
All of the thousands of U.S. and Russian launch-ready weapons only represent an accident waiting to happen and a temptation to terrorists to gain control over them. Maintaining these large, cocked arsenals is not needed to prevent a nuclear war between the United States and Russia, nor does it deter terrorists or provide a useful tool in fighting them. Doing so instead represents a grave danger to the civilized world if these weapons fall into the wrong hands.
Russia is no longer the enemy. We deny this truth at our own peril and expense. Facing and accepting this truth lights a path to deep nuclear reductions and true security. ____________________________________________ Bruce G. Blair is President of the Center for Defense Information, and a former Minuteman launch officer.
California Girls :Beach Boys Well East coast girls are hip I really dig those styles they wear And the Southern girls with the way they talk They knock me out when I'm down there
The Mid-West farmer's daughters really make you feel alright And the Northern girls with the way they kiss They keep their boyfriends warm at night
I wish they all could be California I wish they all could be California I wish they all could be California girls
The West coast has the sunshine And the girls all get so tanned I dig a french bikini on Hawaii island Dolls by a palm tree in the sand
I been all around this great big world And I seen all kinds of girls Yeah, but I couldn't wait to get back in the states Back to the cutest girls in the world
I wish they all could be California I wish they all could be California I wish they all could be California girls
I wish they all could be California (Girls, girls, girls yeah I dig the) I wish they all could be California (Girls, girls, girls yeah I dig the) I wish they all could be California (Girls, girls, girls yeah I dig the) I wish they all could be California (Girls, girls, girls yeah I dig the)
I ain't never had a problem with California There's a lot of good women from Sacramento to Carona But them Hollywood types after a while wearon ya Struttin' around in their size zeros Skinny little girls no meat on their bones Never even heard of George Jones
[Chorus]
Ain't you glad we ain't all California girls Ain't you glad you glad there's still a few of us left. That know how to rock your world Ain't afraid to eat fried chicken and dirty dance to Merle Ain't you glad we ain't all California girls
There ain't nothing wrong with plastic surgery Well Dolly Parton never looked so good to me Everybody ought to be exactly who they want to be But that Paris Hilton Gets under my skin With her big fake smile and and her painted on tan She'd never have a chance at a real man
[Chorus x2]
Ain't you glad we ain't all California girls Ain't you glad you glad there's still a few of us left. That know how to rock your world Ain't afraid to eat fried chicken and dirty dance to Merle Ain't you glad we ain't all California girls
I overlooked this post earlier, and re-reading the topic, thought I'd answer your questions, Dave.
Albeit three years after the fact.
Quote: First Amongst Daves said:
Quote: Originally posted by Dave the Wonder Boy: To my knowledge, the last time it was even considered, except in an accidental launch against a perceived first-strike, was the Cuban Missile Crisis in November 1962.
The example which comes to mind immediately is MacArthur's advocacy of the use of nukes in the Korean War, but Eisenhower didn't like the idea.
That was very early on in the nuclear age, in the late 1940s/early 1950s. They also considered using nukes to open up rivers and dig out places for hydroelectric dams. They didn't fully understand the lingering effects of radiation, on the environment, or on humans.
I think in the modern era, nations that have possessed nukes for 50 years or so have a greater appreciation for their destructiveness, and less willingness to use them.
Quote: First Amongst Daves said: Ah, one more: Nixon wanted to use nukes in Vietnam, but Kissiger refused to let him "become a butcher" (this was revealed last year when White House records were released).
That would surprise me, if accurate. I wonder if Nixon was just brainstorming and suggested the possibility, what if ?
Or whether he had seriously intended to deploy and use nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
Even if Nixon wanted to, I find it hard to believe he actually would. It would invite nuclear retaliation from North Vietnam's allies and suppliers, Russia and China.
Quote: First Amongst Daves said:
Quote: W B said In the 1991 Iraq war, it was threatened by the U.S. that if Iraq used biological or chemical weapons or nukes, that the U.S. would retaliate with nukes. But later was revealed that the U.S. would not have used nukes during that war, in any circumstances.
Later revealed where? I've never heard of this.
I saw this on several sources in the U.S., on ABC's Nightline program, PBS News Hour, and elsewhere.
The threat of Israeli [nuclear] retaliation was not the only deterrent to Saddam's use of chemical-armed rockets.
On 14 August 1991, Defense Secretary Cheney stated that "It should be clear to Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical weapons on United States forces."(12) The American government reportedly used third-party channels to privately warn Iraq that "in the event of a first use of a weapon of mass destruction by Iraq, the United States reserved the right to use any form of retaliation (presumably up to and including nuclear weapons)."(13)
After the initiation of hostilities in January, American officials continued to stress the risk of retaliation.
Defense Secretary Cheney warned that "were Saddam Hussein foolish enough to use weapons of mass destruction, the US response would be absolutely overwhelming and devastating."
Cheney also noted that "I assume (Saddam) knows that if he were to resort to chemical weapons, that would be an escalation to weapons of mass destruction and that the possibility would then exist, certainly with respect to the Israelis, for example, that they might retaliate with unconventional weapons as well."
General Schwarzkopf added that "if Saddam Hussein chooses to use weapons of mass destruction, then the rules of this campaign will probably change."(14)
While one might question whether the United States would actually have used nuclear weapons in response to a chemical attack,(15) Saddam Hussein obviously could not have been confident that we would not. As Bruce Blair noted, "There's enough ambiguity in our deployments of nuclear weapons at sea and our ability to deliver nuclear weapons by air and quickly move them into the region to plant the seeds of doubt in Hussein's mind."(16)
The effectiveness of the threat of chemical or nuclear retaliation was confirmed by Lt. Gen. Calvin Waller, deputy commander of Desert Storm, who stated that "we tried to give him (Saddam) every signal that if he used chemicals against us that we would retaliate in kind and may even do more, so I think he was hesitant to use it there."(17)
The British also made several threats to respond harshly to an Iraqi chemical attack.
On 30 September 1990 it was reported that a senior officer with the British 7th Armored Division, being deployed to Saudi Arabia, claimed that British forces would retaliate with battlefield nuclear weapons if attacked by Iraqi chemical weapons.(18)
On 1 October 1990, British Prime Margaret Thatcher noted that "[y]ou'd have to consider at the time, if chemical weapons were used against us, precisely what our reply should be."(19)
Several days later, British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd stated that an Iraqi chemical attack would "provoke a response that would completely destroy that country."(20)
So not just U.S. words to that effect, but Israeli and British-voiced threats as well, of an overwhelming WMD response to initiation of WMD's by Iraq.
Both Powell and Schwarzkopf said later that because of the inevitability of a nuclear cloud moving over Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other allies in the region, nuclear retaliation was a threat, but the U.S. would never have retaliated with nukes for that reason, despite threats otherwise.
Quote: First Amongst Daves said:
Quote: W B said: The greatest danger is an accidental launch, in reaction to a falsely perceived attack, where one side would launch all their silos, and force the other side to do the same.
I wonder if computer hacks could access nuclear missiles, the way they can programs monitoring power plants and water treatment facilities.
All of these are good arguments in favour of total disarmament.
The problem is, if we disarm, the other side does not. And then "mutually assured destruction" simply becomes our assured destruction.
In an ideal world where everyone plays by the rules, then we could perhaps disarm.
As the articles I posted said (my Feb 4 2006 post), we and Russia could reduce to 1000 or so weapons each.
Reduce perhaps, but not completely disarm.
I knew that Argentina previously had a nuclear weapons program, and was looking online for more info, and found a good and concise description HERE
In the right margin, you can click on summaries of other nations' nuclear arsenals, or their realized or aborted ambitions, such as Libya, Algeria, Brazil and South Africa.
It's reassuring how many had nuclear ambitions for a period, and well-realized nuclear facilities, who with a new government aborted their nuclear programs, and turned them over to international inspectors for dismantlement.
Irishman, Englishman and a German are caught in Saudi Arabia drinking. "Under Saudi law you are sentenced to 30 lashes then deported. Before you begin you are entitled to something on you back, what would you like?" said the prison guard to the Englishman just before lashing him. The English man, being a bit of a cricket fan, asked for linseed oil. When they lashed him on a post and let him go to catch his flight back to London he groaned and crawled to the airport. Next came the German. "Under Saudi law you are sentenced to 30 lashes then deported. Before you begin you are entitled to something on you back, what would you like?" said the prison guard "Nothing" said the German and, after receiving his lashes spat on the ground, called the prison guards Schisers and started off towards the airport. The guards then came to the Irishman. "Under Saudi law you are sentenced to 30 lashes then deported. Before you begin you are entitled to something on you back, what would you like?" "Oh", replied the Irishman, "I'll take the German
Kneeling near the confessional, waiting their turn, were two middle-aged ladies. They witnessed Lena's acrobatics with wide eyes, and one said to the other: "Will you just look at the penance Father Sullivan is givin' out this night, and me without me bloomers on!" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Q: What's Irish and sits outside in the summertime? A: Paddy O'Furniture! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- When the Irish say that St. Patrick chased the snakes out of Ireland, what they don't tell you is that he was the only one who _saw_ any snakes!
Unfortunately I am not refering to the SUperman villian.<p>Check this....<p>http://www.thebulletin.org/clock.html<p> 2002 | Seven minutes to midnight Little progress is made on global nuclear disarmament. The United States rejects a series of arms control treaties and announces it will withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Terrorists seek to acquire and use nuclear and biological weapons.
"There is no creature among all the Beasts of the world which hath so great and ample demonstration of the power and wisdom of almighty God as the Elephant." Edward Topsell, The Historie of Foure-Footed Beastes
"A king who always cares for the elephants like his own sons is always victorious & will enjoy the friendship of the celestial world after death." Kautiliya, scholar of Buddhism in India
Colour has nothing to do with body, either. Guinness is measurably less full-bodied than some golden lagers. The fullness of body or otherwise, depends upon the density of grain with which the brewer started, and the degree of fermentation. The more the beer is fermented, the more the body diminishes. The body-building sugars are converted to alcohol. Unfortunately, alcohol is very calorific
I didn't realize till now just how many nukes have been exploded in tests, roughly 2,000. It was a bit unsettling to watch. Essentially, the earth has already survived a nuclear war.
