WASHINGTON — Months before the operation that killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, the Central Intelligence Agency secretly prepared a public-relations plan that would stress that information gathered from its disputed interrogation program had played a critical role in the hunt. Starting the day after the raid, agency officials in classified briefings made that point to Congress.
But in page after page of previously classified evidence, the Senate Intelligence Committee report on C.I.A. torture, released Tuesday, rejects the notion that torturing detainees contributed to finding Bin Laden — a conclusion that was also strongly implied in “Zero Dark Thirty,” the popular 2012 movie about the hunt for the Qaeda leader. Continue reading the main story Related Coverage
George J. Tenet, left, was director of the Central Intelligence Agency when the brutal tactics began. The report said he misled President George W. Bush. Panel Faults C.I.A. Over Brutality and Deceit in Terrorism InterrogationsDEC. 9, 2014 Report Portrays a Broken C.I.A. Devoted to a Failed ApproachDEC. 9, 2014 President George W. Bush meeting with his war council in the Situation Room in March 2003. Bush Team Approved C.I.A. Tactics, but Was Kept in Dark on Details, Report SaysDEC. 9, 2014 Dianne Feinstein, the chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, explaining the decision to report on C.I.A. tactics. For Dianne Feinstein, Torture Report’s Release Is a Signal MomentDEC. 9, 2014 Senator Saxby Chambliss and five other Republicans released a dissent to the main report. After Senate Report’s Release, Political Divide About C.I.A. Torture RemainsDEC. 9, 2014
“The vast majority of the intelligence” about the Qaeda courier who led the agency to Bin Laden “was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the C.I.A.'s detention and interrogation program, and the most accurate information acquired from a C.I.A. detainee was provided prior to the C.I.A. subjecting the detainee to the C.I.A.'s enhanced interrogation techniques,” the Senate report said. Continue reading the main story Document: The Senate Committee’s Report on the C.I.A.’s Use of Torture
It added that most of “the documents, statements and testimony” from the C.I.A. regarding a connection between the torture of detainees and the Bin Laden hunt were “inaccurate and incongruent with C.I.A. records.”
On Tuesday, the C.I.A. disputed the committee’s portrayal that it had been misleading and disingenuous about the role of that program in the hunt for Bin Laden.
The crucial breakthrough in the hunt was the identification of the courier, known as Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti, who was the terrorist leader’s link to the outside world from his secret compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. His significance gradually came into sharper focus. Continue reading the main story Graphic: 7 Key Points From the C.I.A. Torture Report
But the Senate report shows that the C.I.A. was already actively collecting information about him earlier than was previously known and long before it had obtained any intelligence about him from detainees in its custody.
The United States had started wiretapping a phone number associated with Mr. Kuwaiti by late 2001, and as early as 2002, the C.I.A. had obtained from other sources — including reports from allies based on detainees in their custody — the courier’s alias and the fact that he was one of Bin Laden’s few close associates and “traveled frequently” to meet with him. It also had data on his age, physical appearance and family connections, as well as a recording of his voice — all of which proved crucial to finding him.
It was in 2004 that the C.I.A. came to realize that it should focus on finding Mr. Kuwaiti as part of the hunt for Bin Laden, after it interrogated a Qaeda operative, Hassan Ghul, who had been captured in Iraqi Kurdistan. The report concludes that Mr. Ghul provided “the most accurate” intelligence that the agency produced about Mr. Kuwaiti’s role and ties to Bin Laden. Photo The Senate Intelligence Committee report discredits the notion that the C.I.A. would not have found Osama bin Laden if it had not tortured detainees. Credit Associated Press
But the report emphasizes that Mr. Ghul provided all the important information about the courier before he was subjected to any torture techniques and spoke freely to his interrogators. During that two-day period in January 2004, it said, the C.I.A. produced 21 intelligence reports from Mr. Ghul, who one officer said “sang like a tweetie bird.” Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story Continue reading the main story
“He opened up right away and was cooperative from the outset,” the officer added.
In those initial interrogations, Mr. Ghul portrayed Mr. Kuwaiti as Bin Laden’s “closest assistant” and said he was always with him, identifying him as a likely courier who ran messages between Bin Laden and other leaders of Al Qaeda. He listed him as one of three people most likely to be with Bin Laden, who he speculated was living in a house in Pakistan, with Mr. Kuwaiti handling his needs. Continue reading the main story Graphic: Does Torture Work? The C.I.A.’s Claims and What the Committee Found
Nevertheless, the C.I.A. then decided to torture Mr. Ghul to see if he would say more. He was transferred to a “black site” prison, where he was shaved, placed in a “hanging” stress position, and subjected to 59 hours of sleep deprivation, after which he began hallucinating; his back and abdomen began spasming; his arms, legs and feet began experiencing “mild paralysis”; and he began having “premature” heart beats. During and after that treatment, he provided “no actionable threat information” that resulted in the capture of any leaders of Al Qaeda, the report said. ...
